The Worst Military Spending on Useless Projects and Weapons

From flying lasers that couldn’t hack it to destroyers whose guns lost their bullets to the budget, America’s defense procurement has delivered some truly legendary money pits. This tour of greatest misses isn’t about dunking on the troopsit’s about learning from programs where cost, schedule, and performance went on three separate deployments.

Why “Useless” Happens: A Quick Playbook of Failure

Big-ticket defense programs fail for a handful of predictable reasons: shifting requirements, immature technologies rushed into production, poor cost estimating, and weak testing before committing to buys. Congress tries to police the worst overruns via the Nunn–McCurdy Act, which forces the Pentagon to report and sometimes restructure or terminate programs that blow past cost thresholds. Still, the list of cancellations and “zombie” systems is longand expensive.

Exhibit A: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

Fast, Agile, and… Frequently In the Shipyard

The Navy’s LCS was meant to sprint into shallow waters with swappable mission modules. In reality, the program racked up cost overruns, delays, reliability woes, and underperforming modules, prompting the early decommissioning of multiple hulls far short of their planned service lives. A 2022 Government Accountability Office review called out persistent performance gaps and urged hard choices on what the ships should actually do.

Exhibit B: The Destroyer Whose Rounds Cost a Fortune

Zumwalt’s Advanced Gun System and the $800,000–$1,000,000 Shell

The Zumwalt-class destroyer’s futuristic 155mm guns were paired with a bespoke precision round, the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP). After the class shrank to three ships, the round’s per-shot price climbed toward cruise-missile territoryabout $800,000 to $1 millionand procurement was canceled. The Navy is now pivoting the ships to carry hypersonic missiles to make better use of the expensive hulls.

Exhibit C: JLENSthe Blimp That Broke Loose

Billions for Aerostats, and One Spectacular Getaway

The Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) promised wide-area surveillance at a fraction of aircraft operating costs. Years of delays, setbacks, and cost growth pushed spending toward the multi-billion-dollar mark, and the 2015 “runaway blimp” incident didn’t help. GAO tracked declining funding and lingering questions about viability even before that headline moment.

Exhibit D: The Airborne Laser (YAL-1)

Physics Is a Harsh Program Manager

Mounting a megawatt-class laser in a modified 747 to zap missiles during boost phase looked bold on PowerPoint. In practice, distance, dwell time, atmospheric effects, and basing vulnerabilities undercut military utility. After years of delays and cost growth, funding was cut in 2010 and the program was canceled in 2011.

Exhibit E: The A-12 Avenger II (“Flying Dorito”)

Stealth Attack Jet That Never Flew

Conceived as a next-gen carrier-based stealth attack aircraft, the A-12 collapsed under weight, cost, and schedule problems. The Pentagon canceled the contract in 1991 after billions spent, triggering decades of litigation that the government ultimately won in 2009. The price tag and legal wrangling made the A-12 one of the most infamous naval aviation misfires of the late Cold War.

Exhibit F: RAH-66 Comanche

Stealth Scout Helicopter in Search of a Mission

After nearly $7 billion and twenty years of study and development, the Army cancelled the Comanche in 2004, deciding to refocus funds on upgrading existing helicopters and investing in unmanned systems. It’s a classic case of exquisite technology overtaken by changing needs.

Exhibit G: Future Combat Systems (FCS)

When “System of Systems” Becomes a Tangle

The Army’s sprawling FCS envisioned a networked family of manned, unmanned, and robotic systems. Cost estimates soared toward $200 billion, while immature technologies and a “concurrency” approach (developing, testing, and producing at the same time) magnified risk. Major elements were canceled and re-scoped after billions spent and little fielded.

Exhibit H: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)

Speed Over the Surf, Sunk by Cost

Designed to move Marines from ship to shore at high speed, the EFV spent roughly $3 billion in development before the Marine Corps pulled the plug in 2011, citing survivability concerns, reliability issues, and runaway costs. The Corps pivoted to a more incremental Amphibious Combat Vehicle approach.

Exhibit I: M247 Sgt. York (DIVAD)

The Air-Defense Gun That Couldn’t

Field tests in the mid-1980s found the radar-directed Sgt. York air-defense gun unreliable and ineffective. With performance far short of requirements, the program was canceled after roughly 50 vehicles. It remains a textbook example of trying to retrofit advanced sensors onto a legacy hull without sufficient systems engineering.

Exhibit J: C-27J SpartanBought, Shelved, Reassigned

Short Service Life, Then Off to Other Services

The Air Force acquired the C-27J as a nimble intra-theater lifterthen rapidly divested it amid budget pressure, sending new or lightly used airframes to the “boneyard” and later transferring most to the Coast Guard and Special Operations. Even with second-life utility, the whiplash reflected planning mismatches and sunk costs.

Exhibit K: Stryker Mobile Gun System (M1128)

A 105mm Cannon with Persistent Headaches

Intended to give Stryker brigades mobile direct firepower, the M1128 suffered from obsolescence and maintenance problems with its cannon and autoloader. The Army decided in 2021 to retire all MGS vehicles by the end of 2022 and pursue alternative lethality upgrades across the fleet.

Exhibit L: When “Modernization” Becomes a Money Sink

Ticonderoga Cruisers and the $1.84B That Didn’t Pay Off

GAO reporting indicates the Navy’s effort to modernize aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers consumed roughly $1.84 billion even as several ships were ultimately cut from the fleeta sobering cautionary tale about pouring good money into platforms near retirement.

Exhibit M: Small Items, Big WasteAfghan Projects Edition

$43 Million for a Gas Station

A Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) review found the Pentagon spent roughly $43 million on a single compressed natural gas station in Afghanistan, with thin evidence of sustainable demand. It’s the poster child for boutique infrastructure projects that ignore local economics.

$28 Million for the Wrong Camouflage

Afghanistan’s army adopted a pricey “forest” camouflage pattern ill-suited to local terrain, a decision SIGAR said unnecessarily cost U.S. taxpayers up to $28 million between 2008 and 2017. Senior Pentagon leaders publicly blasted the waste and ordered tighter oversight.

How to Spot a Future Boondoggle

• Concurrent development (building before testing proves maturity).
• Requirement creep (every new feature is “must-have”).
• Single-purpose munitions that lock a platform to bespoke, expensive ammo (see: LRLAP).
• Network-first promises without hardened, interoperable standards (see: FCS).
• Over-optimistic cost estimates that trigger Nunn–McCurdy breaches later.

Lessons Learned (The Hard Way)

Test early, test often. DOT&E-style operational testing should break fragile concepts before production starts. Buy fewer prototypes first. Spiral development, with hard exit ramps, beats “all-in” bets on immature tech. Prefer common munitions and open architectures. That reduces per-shot costs and vendor lock-in. Be ruthless about mission fit. If the mission or threat changes, cancel sooner (Comanche, EFV) and re-invest in what the force actually needs.

Fast FAQ: “But Didn’t Some Programs Redeem Themselves?”

Sometimes, yes. The Zumwalt pivot to hypersonics is a live attempt to salvage a costly hull by giving it an undeniably valuable mission set, even after its original gun concept imploded under ammunition economics. Whether that retrofit fully redeems the investment remains to be seen, but it’s a better play than letting capability and capital idle.

Conclusion

If there’s a moral to this spending saga, it’s that the Pentagon gets the best results when it sets tight requirements, tests like a cynic, and refuses to mortgage tomorrow’s readiness on today’s PowerPoint. Cost control mechanisms exist, from Nunn–McCurdy to GAO oversightbut they work only if leaders are willing to call time on bad bets and pivot quickly to practical alternatives.

sapo: From the Littoral Combat Ship’s unfinished promise to the destroyer whose ammo cost more than a sports car, this in-depth guide unpacks America’s most notorious defense boondoggles. Learn what went wrong, how billions vanished, and the hard-earned procurement lessons that can keep future programs off the waste list.

Field Notes & Editorial Experiences (500+ Words)

Writing about waste in defense is tricky: one person’s “boondoggle” can be another’s “necessary risk.” Here are grounded observations from years of tracking the rise and fall of big programs.

1) Ambition isn’t the enemyunchecked ambition is. The U.S. often aims for leap-ahead capability. That’s healthy, and it occasionally produces miracles. Problems start when a “miracle” is scheduled, costed, and promised before the physics are tamed. The Airborne Laser’s demise wasn’t because lasers never workit was because boost-phase intercept from a vulnerable, predictable 747 demanded near-perfect conditions. When the real world intruded (weather, range, survivability), the concept’s foundation wobbled and costs ballooned.

2) Ammunition economics can make or break a platform. The Zumwalt’s LRLAP saga reads like a cautionary tale for bespoke munitions. Niche ammo tends to be expensive at any scale, but when the planned fleet shrinks, unit costs skyrocket. Suddenly your destroyer’s main guns don’t have affordable rounds, and your exquisite warship needs a new purpose. The Navy’s hypersonic retrofit is a pragmatic pivotpainful, yes, but better than letting the most advanced surface combatants drift.

3) Networks are not a substitute for hardware maturity. FCS bet heavily that a “system of systems” would multiply combat power even if individual components were early and unproven. In practice, immature gear connected to immature gear produces a networked headache. Today’s successful programs flip the script: field reliable increments, then connect them with open, evolvable standards.

4) When missions change, be decisive. Comanche was gorgeous engineering. It also anchored to a reconnaissance concept overtaken by drones, sensors, and different wars. The Army’s cancellation and re-investment into upgrades and unmanned systems was strategically sound. Same logic sank the EFV: crossing a hot beach at 25 knots sounded great until survivability and cost realities intervened.

5) “Cheap to run” is meaningless if the system never runs. JLENS promised low operating costs relative to aircraft, but long delays, test problems, and the infamous tether break created a narrative that the program never escaped. A reasonable operating cost can’t rescue a capability that isn’t militarily viable or politically sustainable.

6) Watch the sustainment bill. The Stryker Mobile Gun System didn’t collapse on the battlefield so much as in the motor pool. Obsolescent components and a finicky autoloader eroded confidence, and the Army chose to cut losses and invest in modernized cannons and missiles across the formation. A lesson for future buys: sustainment risk belongs in the spotlight on day one.

7) Divestment without a plan is wasteful in public. The C-27J’s short, bumpy Air Force career looked terrible to taxpayersnew airframes to the desert, then transfers. The eventual Coast Guard and SOCOM use cases restored value, but not before burning political capital. Early, honest mission analysis beats post-hoc rescue missions every time.

8) “Small” programs can create outsized reputational damage. The $43 million gas station and the $28 million camouflage fiasco were rounding errors in a trillion-dollar enterpriseyet they became national headlines because they’re easy to visualize and hard to justify. That visibility is healthy: it pressures the system to ask obvious questions earlier, like “Will locals actually use this?” and “Why this pattern, at this price, for that terrain?”

9) Oversight workswhen leaders let it. GAO, DOT&E, CRS, and SIGAR aren’t cure-alls, but they provide the receipts. Programs that listen early, test honestly, and accept red-team criticism are far likelier to avoid the “worst spending” list. Those that hide issues behind optimistic PowerPoints usually end up here.

10) The end state isn’t zero riskit’s smarter risk. Defense innovation will always carry uncertainty. The goal is to bound that risk with hard gates, open architectures, incremental deliveries, and real-world testing that can kill or re-shape a program long before it kills the budget.